Abstract-Identity Federations are increasingly being used to establish convenient and secure attribute-based authentication and authorization systems. Whilst this process began mainly in the academic sector, it is assumed that over
I. INTRODUCTION
I DENTITY FEDERATIONS are currently established in several environments and continue to grow. More and more application suppliers and Service Providers join Identity Federations in order to offer their services to authorized users. Especially computer communities, banking, and e-commerce are foreseen as the fields of interest for this paper's targets. Within such a federation 1 , several Service Providers (SP) agree to allow user authentication not on their systems, but at the user's home institution, e.g., the user's university or B. Stiller is with the Department of Informatics (IFI), University of Zurich, Switzerland (e-mail: stiller@ifi.uzh.ch).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/SURV.2013.032713.00098 1 Besides Identity Federation, this survey also describes several federations that are not directly built on identity techniques, such as telco federations; since they can be considered as providing basic elements for Identity Federations.
his telecom operator. This home institution, the so-called Identity Provider (IdP), furnishes, upon request, authentication and attribute data about a specific user to federated Service Providers. Therefore, the Service Providers are able to check, based on the user's data received, whether the user is allowed to have access to a specific resource or to consume a specific service. However, while much research has been carried out regarding authentication and authorization within such federations (e.g., in research projects such as DAMe [1] , SWIFT [2] , AKOGRIMO [3] , and SEMIRAMIS [4] ) and the deployment of these ideas has been carried out successfully within several federation schemes (in Switzerland [5] , Germany [6] , Spain [7] , Finland [8] , Norway [9] , France [10] , Netherlands [11] , and many more countries), one essential aspect is still missing in the federation architecture, that of payment 2 . If Service Providers offer services requiring payment, they have to establish an additional solution for payment transactions without strong interaction with the Identity Federation. Since the area of electronic payment systems is quite broad, the much later invention of SAML has given rise to the fact that the combination of payment schemes and SAML will be beneficial for many stakeholders. Thus, the focus of this survey is on electronic payment systems with a very strong SAML emphasis. For other comparisons, please refer to [12] and [13] and for more background information regarding electronic payment and SAML to [14] and [15] .
This survey is structured as follows: To allow the reader to become more familiar with these issues, there follows the section in which the benefits and, thus, the motivation for payment within Identity Federations are described. This is then followed by the section detailing two scenarios in which the lack of current solutions are described and the benefits for federation-based payments are highlighted. Then, general electronic payment approaches are discussed, being separated into three concepts: (1) the transmission of account information, (2) the transmission of reimbursable data 3 , and (3) the transmission of digital cash. This is followed by the section evaluating Identity Federation approaches, as currently designed. Here, the well-known Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)-based solutions are discussed, but other less successful ideas are described as well. After providing a general overview of electronic payment and Identity Federations, the further section focuses on approaches that were designed to merge identity and payment aspects. Here, several concepts are discussed, from 2G billing solutions [16] up to fully integrated SAML-based payment approaches [17] . Then, in conclusion, the survey results are summarized and the payment approaches for Identity Federations are evaluated regarding the general requirements derived from the two scenarios described below as well as general payment aspects.
A. Motivation and Benefits
Identity Federation solutions as well as electronic payment approaches have been often investigated and secure and reliable mechanisms have been designed. Nevertheless, an integrated Federation-based payment has been considered only marginally, although such a combination may lead to major advantages. To provide a short overview of the benefits of such a solution, the following list presents the advantages of Federation-based payments for participating entities.
(1) Customers: Customers gain benefits of convenience. They do not need any payment accounts except that at the federated Payment Provider and are able to purchase goods all over the federation. Depending on the security level chosen, payment is either automatic or requires authorization by the input of credentials. (2) Service Providers: Service Providers require no additional payment solutions in order to sell its products and services. By implementing the federation software, it establishes a payment solution for federated customers as well. telco operators and network providers may benefit from Federation-based payment. Whilst they often fear of being reduced to a simple bit pipe when electronic commerce is carried out, they can use their usually large account databases to offer several payment solutions to their customers. In that way, they provide their customers with more benefits and can use these other fields of business to increase earnings. These clear advantages for Federation-based payments provide a strong motivation to carry out further design and evaluation efforts.
B. Scenario and Problem Statement
To highlight the challenges and needs for an integrated payment approach for Identity Federations, two scenarios are sketched below to show what is already deployed and what is missing with respect to payment in current Identity Federations. Scenario 1: Roaming Student While studying, a Student visits a foreign university. Since several universities have already established a system of account data exchange, the student does not need to create a new account at the foreign university. Even confederations such as eduGAIN [18] may be used to bridge national Identity Federations. Therefore, the roaming student is able to seek access to restricted resources at the foreign university using his home university account. However, this mechanism for authentication and authorization will be insufficient once payment is required, e.g., when the student wishes to use a printer. Now, the printing system may detect the student's identity and his attributes, it may offer a discount due to the fact that he is a student, but to pay to use the printer, the student needs a new account. Usually, printer usage is not paid using cash or credit card, but by using a pre-paid student account. Thus, although not required for access, the roaming student has to create a new account at the foreign university for such payments. Since an Identity Federation infrastructure already exists, the additional account could be omitted if the federation was able to carry out payments as well [19] . Scenario 2: Business Traveller An employee is required to travel for business purposes. Currently, his company may advance him some of the costs, e.g., hotel and flights. However, the traveller has to purchase a number of items using, e.g., his credit card 4 . Although these costs will be reimbursed by his company at a later date, this is not convenient for the business traveller. Following the approach of Identity Federation-based payments, the traveller could have an account at his company that is connected to a Payment Provider. The company would granted him limited funding while he is abroad. Whenever the traveller has to purchase something, he may use his company account to authenticate and make the necessary payment as well. This Identity-based payment can be done in several ways, e.g., by entering the account credentials into a website for buying flights or hotels, by entering his account details into the device of a taxi driver, or by accessing a wireless payment device in a supermarket. After returning home, his company checks the account withdrawals for correctness.
Both scenarios, the roaming student as well as the business traveller, have presented situations in which the payment processes lacks convenience. These processes could be simplified, made secure and provide more convenience by deploying Identity Federation-based payments. To establish such a Federation-based payment process, reliable electronic payment mechanisms have to be merged with secure Identity Federation technology in order to achieve an integrated payment solution.
Thus, from these scenarios, the following problem statement can be derived: Although a combination of electronic Payment solutions and Identity Federation approaches would provide several benefits to its participants, and although both areas offer lots of research results, there has not been much investigation of such combinations. Therefore, the goal of this survey is to carry out such an investigation and to provide the reader with reliable results.
II. ELECTRONIC PAYMENT
This section provides a brief overview of different approaches for electronic payment. It highlights three possibilities for data submission (submission of account information, submission of reimbursable data, submission of digital money [20] ) and provides short examples of each kind. At the end of this section, requirements for electronic payment are provided and the examples used are evaluated and compared in respect to these requirements. The basic data of the accordant examples in each subsection are summarized in Table I, whilst  Table II provides an overview on how these examples are able to fulfil the derived requirements described at the end of this section in Subsection II-D.
A. Submission of Account Information
The first approach for handling electronic payments is the secure transmission of account information. Here, information about a bank, credit card or a PayPal account, etc. may be sent electronically, e.g., via HTTPS. Although this does not represent a direct payment and may be seen only as a billing mechanism, it does lead towards electronic payment and has to be considered. Therefore, in the following subsections, two examples for submission of account information are given, namely Secure Electronic Transaction (SET), which is used for secure transmission of credit card data, and PayPal, which has become very popular over the last few years. Table I provides a short outline on key data for those and other mentioned approaches.
1) Secure Electronic Transaction: Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [14] is a protocol for securing credit card transactions over the Internet [21] . Thus, it is not a full payment system, but provides all the mechanisms needed for a secure transaction. SET was developed by VISA and MasterCard in 1996 and is now supported by other companies such as IBM, Microsoft, VeriSign, etc. Within the SET framework, four major roles have been identified within a secure transaction:
• The Cardholder is the person who has the credit card. He has a contract with the Issuer in which he promises to pay the debt.
• A Merchant within the SET framework is a person or organization that sells goods or services. It has a contract with the Acquirer to which it has agreed upon receiving payment processing services in return for a fee.
• The Issuer is the company that has issued the card to the Cardholder and is responsible for the payment of the debt -usually by charging the user's account. The Issuer has contracts with the Cardholder and the credit card associations in which it accepts the risk of card debt.
• The Acquirer is an organization that provides card authorization and capture services for Merchants. It is the bridge between the Merchants and the credit card associations. It has contracts with the Merchants and with the credit card associations in which it agrees to their general terms and conditions of business. The paying process defined within the SET framework is as follows: when a customer wishes to buy something from a Merchant, he places an order and receives in turn the Merchant's X.509 certificate and the Acquirer's Payment Gateway X.509 certificate. Both certificates can be validated by the established PKI. The customer returns the payment information to the Merchant. This information contains the order as well as payment information. The order information is encrypted with the Merchant's public key, the payment information with the Acquirer's Payment Gateway public key. Thus, it is impossible for the Merchant to receive the customer's credit card information and it will not be possible for the credit card company to receive information about the goods the user has bought.
The advantages for this approach is higher security and privacy than in most other credit card based payment protocols. Non-repudiation, achieved by the PKI, and following the need-to-know principle are also reasons for the widespread use of this solution. But the drawbacks, resulting from the administrative complexity (each participant has to install separate software and a PKI has to be established with all participants), should not be overlooked.
2) PayPal: PayPal [22], established in 2000 and now a subsidiary of eBay, is currently often used to transfer money related to an online business. To use PayPal, both buyer and seller have to have a PayPal account. After an acquisition, the merchant informs the customer about his PayPal account and the customer uses PayPal to transfer money to the merchant's PayPal account, either from his PayPal account or by submitting his credit card details to PayPal [23] . If a money transfer using a credit card is chosen, the transaction from the customer's bank account to PayPal follows the schema for credit card transfer. To have PayPal as an intermediary institution enables trust, privacy and security. Both parties should trust PayPal, since they have accounts there and PayPal benefits from its reputation; the privacy is enhanced, because only PayPal has knowledge about the user's bank information, and due to PayPal's security implementation (use of SSL; a 'Buyer Protection Policy' and a 'Seller Protection Policy'), security is also enabled within the money transaction.
Using PayPal is very easy and comfortable, so it is expected to become one of the major online payment solutions [24] .
B. Submission of Reimbursable Data
The second approach, to be considered for electronic payment, is the submission of reimbursable data. This approach is based on the transmission of data that can be directly converted into money. This mechanism works in a similar fashion to cheques and is therefore usually used for electronic cheques. Thus, in the following subsections two kinds of electronic cheques are presented as examples for the submission of reimbursable data. Table I provides a short outline on key data for those and other mentioned approaches.
1) NetCheque: NetCheque [14] is a distributed accounting service supporting the credit-debit model within the large pool of payment solutions [20] . A NetCheque user has to have an account at an accounting server. When he needs to issue a cheque, e.g., before or after an online acquisition, the customer issues the cheque in a similar fashion to the conventional way of issuing cheques. Using an application, the customer specifies the name of the payer, the name of the financial institution, the payer's account, the name of the payee, the amount of the cheque, the currency unit and an expiration date. This information is signed by the payer and transferred to the payee. The clearing of the cheque at the payee's side follows the same schema as for conventional cheques. The use of conventional cryptography (requiring less computing power) instead of public cryptography enhances the performance of the NetCheque implementation and enables the possibility to use it for micropayments.
When a user needs to write a cheque, he calls a function that obtains a Kerberos ticket from a Kerberos server. That ticket is used to authenticate the user at the accounting server and to generate an authenticator that is stored in the signature field of the cheque together with a checksum over the cheque data. The signed cheque is then sent using the Internet to the payee. After receiving the cheque, the payee also requests a Kerberos ticket for generating authentication information that is attached together with information about the payee and his account to the cheque. Then, the cheque is sent to the payee's accounting server, where the clearing process starts.
To clear an electronic cheque issued and received within the USA, e.g., a NetCheque, the Automated Clearing House (ACH) Network [25] may be used, which is a USA-wide electronic funds transfer system that provides interbank clearing of electronic payments for those participating depository financial institutions . Since this clearing house network is bound to the national rules of the USA, several European countries have established their own clearing house network, which is called the 'Pan-European Automated Clearing House' (PEACH) [26] .
2) Electronic Check: Another electronic cheque solution was proposed by CommerceNet and called eCheck [27] . This approach works similarly to the NetCheque idea, but instead of traditional cryptography with Kerberos, a public key infrastructure with X.509 certificates guarantees the genuineness of the signatures. When a user opens an account at a bank that supports the Electronic Check technique, he receives an electronic smart card, which is used to protect the user's private key from theft and misuse [28] . The payer uses an issued application to write data on an electronic cheque, which is illustrated in the same way as a conventional cheque. After filling out the form, the payer signs it with the key on the issued smart card received from his bank when requesting eCheck support and sends the cheque to the payee. The payee, in turn, adds his own account information and signature to the cheque and forwards it to his bank. There, the cheque is cleared by sending it to the payer's bank that validates the payer's information. After successfully passing validation, the amount is transferred from the payer's account at the payer's bank to the payee's account at the payee's bank. The cheque is written in FSML (Financial Services Markup Language) [29] , a tag-based HTML-like language to support the data structures and cryptographic signatures that are needed for cheques.
To enhance security, eCheck allows the payer to first send the cheque to his bank. The bank validates the payer's identity and checks his account. When all the information is correct, the bank countersigns the cheque and sends it back to the payer. In this case, the payee trusts the bank's signature on the cheque and assumes that the cheque will be cleared and he will receive the amount conveyed within it.
C. Submission of Digital Money
The third electronic payment solution is the submission of digital money. Following this approach, the transmitted data is no longer just payment information, but the money demanded. The payer uses this data to pay the payee, and the payee does not need to reimburse this data or to use the received information for any bank transaction. Although no widely accepted approach for digital money has been designed, the following subsections provide information about two examples for realising digital money. Table I provides a short outline on key data for those and other mentioned approaches.
1) Digital Cash: Chaum [14] , [30] proposed in 1988 the first digital-cash scheme. Although it is no longer implemented or used in other ways due to computational drawbacks, it can be seen as the foundation for many of the following approaches and improvements, e.g., the suggestion from Brands [31] and Mu [32] .
A digital-cash approach being much more efficient than Chaum's original scheme was proposed by Brands [31] . This system consists of Payers, Payee and a Bank. During the setup, the client, which later acts as Payer, generates a key pair and sends the public key to the Bank. When the Payer needs a 'coin', the Bank sends cryptographic information and he identifies himself at the Bank by returning a 'signature' attached to this information. To withdraw a coin, the Payer generates the cryptographic coin and sends the coin information to the Bank, where this information is signed and sent back to the Payer. The coin consists only of cryptographic material generated by the Payer and the Bank and is countersigned by the other party. Banks do not propose an amount to be stated in the coin. When the coin has been sent to a Payee, the Payee sends the Payer a receipt, which is signed and sent back to the Payee. Afterwards, the Payee checks the cryptographic coin as far as he can and sends it to the Bank for depositing. The Bank can check, using a list, if the coin has already been spent (due to the coin-related signatures of the Payer and the Bank), and is thus able to discover illegal spending. An illegal use of the coin cannot be detected by the Payee without immediately contacting the Bank. Without the stored information, the Payer, who requested the coin from the Bank, is not identifiable from the coin's information.
Brands' approach was enhanced to achieve a fair-digitalcash scheme; the most efficient schemes were from Davia et al. [33] and Camenisch et al. [34] . When using these approaches, it is necessary to extend Brands' schema that uses three basic protocols (withdrawal, payment, deposit) with two new protocols: the Owner-Tracing Protocol and the Coin-Tracing Protocol [14] . A tracing component, the Trusted Authority, is also introduced. During the withdrawal phase, the Payer uses the Trusted Authority's public key to encrypt an identifier, either an encrypted ID that identifies him or the coin itself. If the anonymity has to be revoked, the Trusted Authority can decrypt the given information by using its private key. Admittedly, if the Bank would store more information (which may affect the user's privacy) than needed for validating the coin in Chaum's scenario, the Trusted Authority is not needed, since the Bank information would be enough to identify both the Payer and the coin.
2) NetCash: The University of Southern California developed the NetCash [35] framework for electronic currency. It was intended to provide a real-time electronic payment system. NetCash allows anonymous payments without needing tamper-proof hardware, but with the ability to detect illegal creation, copying and reuse of the electronic currency. The central components of this approach are the Currency Servers, which are registered to a non-anonymous payment infrastructure, e.g., electronic cheques or other payment protocols. This connection allows the Currency Servers to issue electronic coins without having the ability to reimburse the coins into real money. It is possible that some Currency Servers are connected only to other Currency Servers and not directly to the nonanonymous infrastructure, but in that hierarchical solution, the top Currency Server must be connected to this non-anonymous infrastructure.
An electronic coin in the NetCash environment contains all the information about the monetary value of the coin, a URL that specifies the Currency Server, which has issued the coin, a timestamp to state the coin's lifespan and a serial number. All this information is signed with the Currency Server's private key. A payer, who wishes to pay with such a coin, receives it from a Currency Server. The payment is done by submitting the signed coin to the payee. After that, the payee has to validate the coin by sending it to the Currency Server, whose address is indicated in the coin's data. The Currency Server checks the coin's serial number against a list of outstanding numbers of already issued coins and examines its lifetime. If the coin is valid, the server issues a new coin to the payee that can be used for further payment.
This approach allows payment with electronic coins in an anonymous manner. The coins are protected against forgery and overspending by the use of a serial-number list at the Currency Server. Since the coins are replaced after each payment and information about the transaction is not saved, they can be seen as untraceable. The main drawback of the solution is the need for contacting the Currency Server immediately after the transaction to check the coin's validity. The ability of the Currency Server to record the payer, to whom the coin has been issued, as well as the payee, who requests validation at the server, can be seen as privacy concern.
3) Bitcoin: Bitcoin [36] is a digital currency system relying on a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. The 'money' of this currency is created in a so-called mining process that includes solving a cryptographic challenge. Bitcoins that have been received or created in the mining process can be stored on a computer or within a digital wallet.
When a transaction is being carried out, the payer sends Bitcoins to the payee and a public record is created that includes information about the accordant transaction. However, this transaction will have the status 'unconfirmed' and the network has to validate the transaction, i.e., to check whether the Bitcoins have already been spent. Thus, the P2P network can be seen as a large group of notaries, which mutually approve their signatures. Since this paper is not going to explain the cryptographical methods for digital cash, the exact procedures for mining and validating will not be explained here, but can be found in [37] .
Whilst not focusing on the technical details, the system Therefore, this system is already being accepted by some institutions and people. However, although the core system of Bitcoin is seen as secure to a high level, this does not mean that there do not exist points of weaknesses. An attack on one of Bitcoin's exchanges places in June 2011 has led to the loss of approximately 500,000 coins with a value of more than 8 million US Dollars [39] .
Another attack against the Bitcoin system resulted in the theft of 25,000 coins with a value of approximately 500,000 US Dollars [40] . This attack had been carried out by stealing the coins from a hacked computer. Since Bitcoin is an anonymous currency, the stolen coins could not be tracked and, therefore, were a loss for their legitimate owner.
D. Comparison
When considering Table I , it became obvious that since 1988 several approaches for electronic payment have been designed, focusing on different participants and technology.
In order to compare the electronic payment solutions, as described above, requirements have to be defined, which act as a basis for the comparison. Definitions of general requirements 5 for electronic payment are hard to find, since electronic payment solutions often are designed to fulfil the needs of a specific environment and cannot be used outside of this environment. However, Kou [14] as well as Medvinsky and Neuman [35] have defined several general aspects of security and privacy issues for digital cash, which can be enhanced to become requirements for all electronic payment approaches:
• Unforgeability and overspending detection: since electronic currency is, at first, only data and far easier to reproduce than paper currency, the possibility for copying or overspending should be prevented. Ideally, the illegal creation, copying and spending of electronic currency should not be possible. However, some systems rely only on the detection of misuse to be followed by punishment after such misbehaviour.
• Anonymity and Untracability: the identity of those entities that use electronic currency should be protected. It should neither be possible to monitor a user's spending patterns nor to track the flow of money.
• Scalability: the system and the environment that have to be established for using electronic payment should handle the addition of users and resources without suffering a noticeable loss of performance. Scalability issues may occur, e.g., when the system relies on a centralized server or a database is used for detecting overspending.
• Acceptability: it is important that an ePayment solution is accepted by several banks. That could be achieved by, e.g., the use of open standards instead of proprietary software.
• Offline operation: a safe transaction between payer and payee should be possible without demanding to be connected to a specific authority or to establish the connection immediately after the transaction.
• Transferability: electronic funds received by the payee may be used for another payment process without having to contact intermediately the issuing authority.
• Hardware independence: the process should not rely too much on special hardware, as is done in some payment solutions that build on tamper-proofed hardware. Hardware dependence could lead to lax security when new and unexpected technology is launched. However, further problems may result from low acceptability and hardware cost.
• Fairness: for a fair ePayment approach, the anonymity of the participants is not granted every time. In fact, a trusted third party must be able to detect the user's identity in case of misuse. This should only be possible if the payment solution does not prevent misuse of the system by the user in general. The above requirements can now be used as a basis for all online payment system evaluations. Therefore, the electronic payment approaches, as described above, are rated by how much they adopt these principles. An analysis of these approaches in relation to the requirements is shown in Table II .
No matter how many of these requirements are fulfilled by an approach, this approach cannot be taken as a basis for any Identity Federation payment, since it has been designed only for electronic payment and all such approaches leave out the idea of a federation. If one of these approaches were to be chosen for payment, it would still be only as an add-on to a federation.
III. IDENTITY FEDERATIONS
In this section, the second foundation for Federation-based payments is described, that of Identity Federations. Here, the major Identity Federation approaches are discussed separately and then compared to elicit information about the mechanisms currently most used. This discussion starts with the major SAML-based federations -i.e., Shibboleth, Liberty Alliance and the Web Service Federation. This section then highlights other important approaches such as Cardspace, OpenID and Kerberos, and smaller solutions (Permis and Akenti) are mentioned as well. Following these Web-based federations, approaches in the Grid area, such as VOMS and CAS, are discussed and, finally, several academic federations that are not based on Shibboleth, such as PAPI, A-Select and FEIDE, are also described. More information about Identity Federations, especially related to privacy concerns, can be found in [41] and [42] .
A. Shibboleth
Shibboleth [43] is a package of several supporting functions for Web Single Sign-On (SSO) across or within organizational boundaries. It is based on SAML and represents one of the most used federation supporting packages within the academic arena. Shibboleth is currently deployed using mostly versions 1.3 and 2.1. Since Shibboleth changes its architecture between these versions, both will be explained in detail.
A Shibboleth federation consists typically of one or more Identity Providers (IdP), which hosts user data, of one or more Service Providers (SP), which offers restricted resources to users, and of users who wish to access protected SPresources using Web-browsers [44] , [45] . Version 1.3 provides an optional Where-Are-You-From (WAYF) component, which identifies the user's IdP and the user itself. In version 2.x of Shibboleth, the WAYF component has been replaced by a more powerful discovery service. Shibboleth supposes that the user seeks access to the restricted resources by calling a website using his Web-browser [46] . Thus, the Shibboleth infrastructure is built on the idea of a Web-browser based interaction between the federation's parties.
Although Shibboleth does not specify how the trust within the federation shall be established, the kind of establishment is almost the same within each deployed Shibboleth federation: The setup of the federation is done statically. Each federation member has to sign contracts with the federation's manager or with every participant to establish a trust relationship between all members of the same federation. Furthermore, all participants have to share X.509 certificate information that is accessible in the federation's metadata. This metadata, which should be updated regularly by the federation members to ensure security, and its handling are part of the Shibboleth bundle.
The authentication is done as follows: the user accesses the restricted website and is redirected (by HTTP redirect [47] ) to the WAYF (v1.3) or the Discovery Service (v2.x), where he has to choose his IdP. After selection, the WAYF/Discovery Service redirects the user to his IdP where he has to authenticate himself. The IdP validates the user's credentials and sends either a POST or a redirect to the user, depending on which of the two profiles (POST or artifact) is used. The POST Profile demands a post-message that includes the SP's address in its action tag and the base64 encoded SAML Authentication Assertion in its hidden target tag. By the use of the POST command, the Assertion Consumer Service (ACS), which is a part of the SP, receives the assertion. If more user attributes are required in order to facilitate a decision for the user's access [48] . Now, the ACS has first to resolve the artifact by contacting the IdP's Artifact Resolution Service (ARS) via SOAP. The ARS responds with a SAML Authentication and the process continues just as has been described for the POST profile. However, although Shibboleth supports the federation, it does not provide all the necessary aspects of a reliable Identity Federation. The IdP requires an Identity Management System and the SP a Policy Management System, neither of which are contained within the Shibboleth bundle. Furthermore, Shibboleth provides a solution for Single Sign-On, but the possibility for a user to carry out a single logout 6 is missing.
B. Liberty Alliance
Whilst the Shibboleth approach is mainly used within an academic context, Liberty Alliance was formed by several organizations and vendors in response to Microsoft's Passport system. Thus, it is placed in the commercial sector. Unlike the Shibboleth consortium, the specifications that the Liberty Alliance Project has provided are not just specific to supporting only a basic Identity Federation. Indeed, the Liberty Alliance consortium has written numerous specifications (14 of which are currently valid [49] ). However, although many of them can be used to enhance an Identity Federation, of these specifications, only two are relevant regarding federationbased payment: the Liberty Alliance ID-FF 1.2 Specifications, describing the architecture of an Identity Federation (ID-FF), and the Liberty Alliance ID-WSF 2.0 Specifications, setting up a framework for a higher-level Web service architecture associated with identity. Those two specifications are described in detail in the following subsections.
1) Liberty ID-FF:
Liberty ID-FF [50] is an approach to build circles of trust between Identity Providers and Service Providers, which enables Identity Federations. Before userinitiated processes can start, both IdP and SP have to be federated, which means that an explicit trust relationship has to be established between them and that they have to create handles for each other, which are used later. The user's identity information does not have to be stored at one IdP; Liberty ID-FF provides the opportunity to merge user profiles from different IdPs and SPs -a process called 'account linking'.
The Single Sign-On process in a Liberty Alliance Identity Federation is very similar to Shibboleth's process. Similarities can be found in the process specifications as well as in the protocols used. This SSO process, within a Liberty Alliance Identity Federation, is defined as follows: the user visits an SP by using his Web-browser and is, after selecting the correct IdP for login, redirected to this IdP with an embedded parameter indicating the originating SP. The user authenticates himself at the IdP and receives, after a valid login, another redirect command, this time back to the SP, together with either a SAML Artifact or a POST-form with the embedded SAML Authentication Assertion. For the Artifact Profile, the SP contacts the IdP and requests a full assertion using SOAP [51] . The ID-FF Architecture does not focus on the transmission of attributes for authorization purposes, but [51] specifies a possible approach to transmit attributes in the same way as proposed by Shibboleth Identity Federations: as a SOAP connection between the SP and the IdP using the ID-FF architecture and SAML Attribute Assertions.
Regarding consumers' convenience within the federation, the Liberty Alliance Project provides two major distinctions in relation to the Shibboleth established federations: The Liberty Alliance protocols support anonymity as well as a single logout.
2) Liberty ID-WSF: Whilst Liberty ID-FF describes the basic Identity Federation architecture, ID-WSF [52] specifies a Web-based federation at a higher level. Again, using a SOAP binding profile, a SOAP-based invocation framework for identity services is provided. A Discovery Service [53] , which is one of the core identity services, is used to discover the users' registered identity services 7 . Thus, the user is not seen as having his account only at one Identity Provider. It is possible to merge different identity information from different identity hosts. Liberty ID-WSF uses SAML as a language for identity and concordant security information. The ID-WSF protocol will not be described in detail here, since it follows the concept of ID-FF with some extensions that are, except for the Discovery Service, not relevant to the development of a payment enabled federation.
C. Web Service Federation
Web Services Federation (WS-Fed) [54] is part of an overall effort by IBM and Microsoft to build a Web services security framework, or WS-Security. This approach, which supports the request for Web services using a SOAP client as well as using Web browsers (access with HTTP), is built on WS-Trust [55] .
The main components in a WS-Federation are the Requestor, which wishes to have access to a restricted resource, the resource itself, which may have specific restrictions relating to its access, and an Identity Provider combined with a Security Token Service (STS). Other components are the Attribute Services and the Pseudonym Services, which are of less importance. The requestor uses either his Webbrowser or a requestor service to request access to the resource. The Identity Provider performs authentication and provides identity confirmations by issuing security tokens. Attributes are received from an Attribute Server, which can be combined with the Identity Provider. If pseudonymity is required at the resource, the Attribute Service is enhanced by a Pseudonym Service, which aligns the requestor's attributes with a pseudonym. The authorization is carried out by an Authorization Service, a specific instance of an STS that operates in a decision brokering process. Different types of authentication (e.g., password, strong password, smart card, etc.) are specified within the WS-Fed environment and can also be used in the authorization process.
The process of accessing a protected resource within the WS-Fed environment may be seen as follows: When a requestor initially asks for access at a Resource Provider using his Web-browser, he is redirected (in some cases with the Resource Provider's IdP as an intermediate component) from the resource to his IdP. The information about the requestor's IdP should be received by interacting with the requestor, if not already known at the resource. After the requestor authenticates at his IdP, this IdP issues a security token and sends it in another redirect to the Resource Provider, where the security token is examined in order to decide access. If the resource provider needs the user's attributes, the same method (contacting the user's IdP by a Web-redirect) is chosen. Information about the required attributes as well as token information is stated in the redirect command. To avoid the need to request a security token each time the requestor seeks access, artifacts can be stored as cookies in the requestor's browser. However, due to the lack of security in this approach, WS-Fed although providing the mechanism does not demand its implementation.
A requestor, using the Web Service federation approach to access the resource with SOAP, uses the Requestor Service to connect to the resource. The Resource Provider returns a policy to indicate the communication requirements. Usually, this policy forces the requestor to authenticate at his Identity Provider in order to receive the security token. If the resource provider's IdP has to act intermediately, the requestor sends his security token to that IdP and requests another security token that enables access to the resource. The access-granted token, either the token from the requestor's IdP or that from the resource provider's IdP, is then sent to the Resource Provider. If attributes are needed to decide the access request, they are requested from the requestor's Attribute Service, which may be combined with the IdP, using the same mechanism as when receiving the security token.
Compared to the other approaches described, it is worth mentioning that the WS-Fed solution offers a Pseudonym Service, which can be used by the Requestor to hide his identity behind a pseudonym.
D. Microsoft Windows Cardspace
Microsoft CardSpace (formally Microsoft Info Card) [56] is used to provide reliable identification of communication partners on the Internet without requiring the users to have a username/password combination for each of the visited sites. Thus, this approach provides Single Sign-On. CardSpace is a user-centric identity information management system based on the WS-* connection specifications [57] .
Within a CardSpace environment, three roles are defined: Subject, Identity Provider and Relying Party. The Identity Provider issues digital identity and the concordant information, such as the identity 'business' providing business information issued by a business identity provider or 'citizen' providing citizen information issued by the government. The Relying Party controls the resources the subject wants to access. Whenever a subject seeks access to a CardSpace protected resource, the Relying Party demands an Information Card from the subject that matches the requirements of the Relying Party's policy system. The subject, in turn, requests this card either directly by one of his Identity Providers or sends an already stored card to the relying party. If the transmitted Information Card is valid, the subject gets access to the resource.
One important difference to most of the other federation concepts is the user-centric approach of CardSpace. The subjects are given the Information Cards to be stored locally -providing a convenient visualization of these datasets. Furthermore, the subject can create his own cards.
E. OpenID
OpenID [58] is a user-centric SSO system for Web-based service access, which is similar to Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance on the one hand and CardSpace on the other, but intended not to be as powerful as these three approaches. The process of authentication and authorization suggested by OpenID starts with the user, who has to select one of the OpenID providers available. There, the user enters, e.g., by using a Web-form within his browser, the attributes, the OpenID provider shall be aware of. However, each time, a Web-resource Service Provider requires attributes, the user provides his OpenID-identifier, which is a URL pointing to his attributes at his OpenID provider. The Service Provider, also called the Relying Party within an OpenID environment, redirects the user to his OpenID provider, where he has to authenticate, e.g., with a username/password combination or a user certificate. After a successful login, the OpenID provider redirects the user back to the Relying Party. The required attributes and identity information about the user are contained in this redirect message. Thus, the Relying Party will receive them. After examining these attributes and consulting the Policy Decision System, the Relying Party informs the user about its access decision.
The advantage of OpenID, compared to several other solutions, is its straightforwardness. Furthermore, the user is able to decide, at the step when he provides his attributes to the OpenID system, which attributes are going to be released later. But since the user provides these attributes and not a trusted entity, they cannot be considered useable for processes demanding higher security.
F. Kerberos
Kerberos [59] is the most used approach for a Single SignOn solution outside of a Web-based implementation. Its basic architecture contains three different kinds of participants: the Client, who wishes access to a resource, the Server, which hosts the resource and controls its access, and the Kerberos Server, which handles the client's authentication [60] .
Whenever the Client needs access to a resource, he firstly authenticates at his Kerberos Server by submitting his credentials, e.g., username and password, smart card, etc. Then he receives an encrypted Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). This TGT is presented to the Kerberos Server in the target realm, i.e., the domain that hosts the resource. The target Kerberos Server validates the TGT based on a predefined cross-realm key and sends a Kerberos Ticket to the Client containing authorization data. This ticket is then presented by the Client to the Server that hosts the resource, which, in turn, allows the access to the resource providing the ticket is valid.
Security in Kerberos is enhanced by using a PKI with the exchange of symmetric keys and shared secrets. The distribution of the shared secret is carried out by the Authentication Server during the Client's initial authentication.
A major drawback to Kerberos is the static nature of its tickets: The Authentication Server has to include all authorization information in the ticket it issues to the Client. This disables the possibility for a finely granulated access decision function and inflates the amount of data conveyed within the ticket.
G. Permis
The Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure Standards Validation (PERMIS) [61] , [62] is an authorization infrastructure, which provides all the necessary facilities for (a) users to manage privileges and authorization policies and for (b) applications to make authorization decisions. In Permis, authorization is achieved by Attribute Certificates that contain the roles of the user. PERMIS cannot be seen as a feasible Identity Federation System, since it offers no predefined SSO. Another problem is the storage of the attribute certificates in a central repository. This does not allow high granularity regarding information presented by the user (privacy issues) and also forces the Resource Provider to send defined policies to the repository.
When using PERMIS to receive access to a resource, the user sends his access request to an Access Enforcement Function. This function contacts an Access Decision Function that decides, based on the access policy and the user's attribute certificate, both stored in a repository, if the user is authorized to have access to the resource. This decision is then sent back to the Access Enforcement Function, which, in turn, submits the information to the target resource's access control system. However, due to the mentioned disadvantages (no SSO, central storage of attribute certificates, central storage of access policies, etc.) the Permis approach is not considered as a suitable solution for a large Identity Federation.
H. Akenti
Akenti [63] is a security model and architecture that is intended to provide scalable security services in highly distributed network environments. Akenti handles authentication and authorization issues. It manages the whole access control with several certificates and decouples, in a very strict way, the access-decision from the resource provider. This allows a simple structure and easy transmission of data, but comes with the disadvantage that all policy certificates have to be stored centrally. This does not support the quick integration of new Service Providers and presents a scalability problem for large federations. Another critical issue is that Akenti links identity directly with permissions, which may be vulnerable to fragmentation and inconsistencies between those permissions. The Akenti certificates do not conform to a standard. Akenti cannot provide SSO since it offers no adequate means of authentication.
In Akenti, the user's authentication is done by presenting his X.509 certificate to the Gateway of the target resource. The Gateway contacts the Akenti system that then locates the policy certificate of the resource and collects the resource's use-condition certificates and the user's attribute certificates (possibly from multiple locations). Based on this information, an access decision is carried out and sent back to the resource's Gateway, which, in turn, grants the user access to the protected resource.
The described disadvantages of Akenti (central policy storage, linking identity to permissions, no SSO) are similar to those of Permis and, therefore, Akenti is also not able to fulfil the requirements of a large Identity Federation.
I. Grid Federations
As well as the approaches described above relating to Webresources or Web-services access, in the Grid community, solutions for distributed access control were also being established. For a long time, the Grid was only seen as providing distributed computing power [64] . Thus, the problem of identity management was related to the question of how to manage access to a computing cluster. Since such a cluster was often protected by a Gatekeeper, it was easy to use this component as the authentication and authorization entity. However, over the last few years, the idea of Grids has been extended to Virtual Organizations (VOs). Whilst at the beginning of Grid computing different processors were combined to increase the computing power, in VOs several services from different organizations are combined into a bundled package, which is offered to customers [3] . This has changed the requirements for identity management, since the VOs are no longer hidden statically behind a Gatekeeper, but are dynamically combined. The authorization mechanism does not only demand the user to be a VO participant, but can now require specific user attributes; e.g., a field of study for a student, past diseases for a patient or simply an address for charging issues. Thus, this subsection describes two of the current major approaches for identity management and Identity Federations within Grid environments.
Although Grid Federations have started very early to deploy authentication and authorization mechanisms, they are often focused on the specific requirements of the accordant Grid and, thus, usually not able to address the demands of an open and wide-spread Identity Federation.
1) VOMS:
The Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) [65] , [66] provides information on the user's relationship with his Virtual Organization; information about his groups, roles and capabilities is placed within a certificate. VOMS is a system for managing authorization data within multi-institutional collaborations. It is not in a position to offer full SSO without having an unnecessarily large amount of data for authentication and authorization purposes in the certificates. The certificates are issued by the VOMS Server whilst the user is logging in and are independent from those attributes a Service Provider may request. Another disadvantage of VOMS is that the user has to know which data he needs (or which VO and resource he wishes to access) when he authenticates to the VOMS Server. Later, when he requires different attributes, he has to request a new Attribute Certificate. In this case, VOMS does not recommend any authorization mechanism or mention in which way the received Attribute Certificates should be examined. Even without providing SSO, the related data within the certificates is very large.
The process of authorizing a user within a VOMS environment is carried out as follows: when a user needs access to a resource, he first authenticates with the VOMS Server by presenting his previously received certificate and sends a signed request to the Sever. The VOMS Server checks the request and sends back the user's information in a pseudocertificate. The user then creates a proxy-certificate containing all the information received from the VOMS Server in a non critical extension of the certificate. This proxy certificate is then sent by the user to the Resource Provider, where it is examined and based on the information therein, an access decision is made.
2) CAS: Building on the Globus Toolkit [67] Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI), the Community Authorization Service (CAS) [68] allows Resource Providers to specify coursegrained access control policies in terms of communities as a whole, delegating fine-grained access control policy management to the community itself. The CAS identity model is very simple and does not record groups or roles. The used information is stored in a critical section of the transmitted certificates so that those servers that are not aware of the CAS system need to be modified in order to work in a federation that uses CAS. CAS cannot provide a real Single Sign-On, since it binds user identity strictly with the community. There is lot of data that has to be relayed in the CAS approach. Thus, it is not a convenient solution for mobile environments.
When a CAS user needs access to a resource, he authenticates at his CAS Server and requests a certificate. The CAS Server grants the user specific rights within the specific community and sends a certificate, containing information about those rights, back to him. The user then presents this proxy certificate to the Resource Provider and the Provider checks the rights of the community the user belongs to as well as the rights of the user within this community and then makes an access decision.
J. Western European NREN Federations
Whilst, within the industrial and commercial sector, large federations with many SPs are not common, within the academic arena several approaches to federate the academic SPs within one country have been established. More and more European National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) are currently deploying national Identity Federations and offering participation to served universities and other academic institutions. However, although many of these federations are strictly built on the Shibboleth system, some of the NRENs have deployed other solutions. Therefore, this section provides an overview on those federation technologies within the NRENs that are not built on the approaches already described. However, since these implementations cover only a small number of users and are not widely spread, these approaches are only described briefly, just to provide an overview, but it has to be kept in mind that they are nichesolutions for the specific needs of the accordant NREN, which is a similar disadvantage as for the Grid solutions, focusing also only on specific requirements.
1) PAPI:
The Point of Access to Providers of Information (PAPI) [69] is part of the AAI of the Spanish NREN RedIRIS. The conceptual design follows the SAML/Shibboleth/Liberty Alliance approach. The user stores his data in an account at an Authentication Server (AS). When he tries to access resources at different Points of Access (PoA) within the Internet without being authenticated, the PoA redirects the user to a PAPI WAYF, which is defined in the federation metadata. There, the user selects his AS, where he is able to authenticate. Following a successful authentication, the AS sets an authentication cookie in the user's browser that identifies him at the PoAs. The cookie contains a signed assertion that states the requested user attributes for authorization purposes. The PoA, to which the user is redirected, examines the authentication cookie and carries out a decision based on the received user attributes. For a successful authorization, a PoA specific access cookie is set into the user's browser. By having that cookie, the user is allowed access to the resources of the provider that are kept behind the PoA.
2) A-Select: SURFnet, the Dutch NREN, developed the ASelect [70] AAI. The three main components -apart from the user -within this architecture are the A-Select enabled application, the A-Select Server and the Authentication Service Provider (AuthSP). In brief, the SSO mechanism can be described as follows: The user tries to access a Web application with his Web-browser. Since he cannot provide the required credentials, he is redirected to an A-Select Server, which is aware of all federated AuthSPs and redirects the user to the correct one. From there, after a successful login, the user is redirected again to the A-Select Server, this time carrying signed authentication information, from the AuthSP, in the redirect statement. The A-Select Server, in turn, issues a ticket granting ticket and sends it with the redirect information that the user redirects to the application. Now, the Application Provider is able, based on the ticket granting ticket, to run its own authentication/authorization process. If the process is carried out successfully, an Application Ticket is issued and stored in the user's browser as a non-persistent cookie.
3) FEIDE: FEIDE (Federated Electronic Identity) [71] is the AAI federation for Norway's NREN UNINETT. It is based on SAML 2.0 and supports SSO. The FEIDE federation is built from four main components: the User that needs access to a restricted resource, the Service Provider that controls the access to the specific service, a central login service called Moria [72] and an Identity Provider. Moria only controls authentication, the credentials are checked at the User's IdP and the User's attributes are released by the IdP as well.
Within FEIDE, the access decision at the Service Provider is carried out as follows: whenever a User tries to access a restricted resource, the Service Provider contacts the Moria Service (using SOAP) and requests an authentication assertion. Moria answers with a URL of a login page, to where the Service has to redirect the User. The User submits his credentials at this login page and Moria contacts the User's IdP, usually his school or academic institution, for validation. This home institution sends authentication information back to the Moria Service and also issues the User attributes to Moria. After successful authentication, the User is again redirected from the login page back to the service; a Moria ticket (text string) is included in the redirect command. When the Service needs more information about the User, the Service Provider sends the Moria ticket back to the Moria Service and Moria issues the User attributes the Service has requested. In addition to this process, Moria/FEIDE provides a direct authentication for services that cannot use HTTP based redirection.
K. Summary
Considering the quantity of federation specifications, it is now clear that, currently, several different approaches for Identity Federations exist. On the one hand, this overview has shown the importance of establishing payment solutions for Identity Federations, since hardly any of them has yet to integrate payment. On the other hand, this list shows how widespread the concept of Identity Federations is. Table III presents an overview of the Identity Federations described, together with some of their major properties. It is obvious that two kinds of Identity Federations can be extracted: the first is the SAML-based approach, such as Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance, and the second is the user-centric cardbased solution. However, as this overview indicates and a survey from the Concordia project attests [73] , the SAMLbased solution is more often deployed than the user-centric solution.
IV. PAYMENT SOLUTIONS FOR IDENTITY FEDERATIONS
In the following third major section of this survey, the contemporary design approaches to bridge electronic payment and Identity Federations 8 are described in detail. Besides a simple description of existing technologies, this section also provides novel perspectives of SAML-based payment. However, since strict payment solutions integrated into Identity Federations are very rare, charging and billing approaches for federations are also described. Thus, this section provides a major overview of payment approaches for federations, spanning charging mechanisms within 2G and 3G environments and fully integrated SAML-based payment solutions. Complex architectures are visualized also with figures, while simple architectures are described only by text. To conclude this section, a comparison of the described approaches is made.
A. 2G and 3G Billing Systems
Billing in a 3G environment refers to the capacity of a wireless communication Service Provider to capture, rate, and bill next-generation mobile communications events. These events include voice, data, and electronic content such as mobile Web browsing and e-mail, mobile commerce activities, and video streaming.
In the 1990s, the introduction of 2G communications demanded a reliable billing mechanism for the novel wireless environment [16] . Any direct payment scheme was not foreseen and even the billing solution focused only on voice minutes based on Call Detail Records (CDR) [74] . However, the transition to 2.5G and finally 3G and the introduction of wireless data communications such as WAP and GPRS demanded new billing formats, which have been standardized by the Global Billing Association [75] . Even then, only billing mechanisms were deployed and payment mechanisms have been implemented only as pre-paid or post-paid solutions, e.g., the Online Charging System presented by Huawei [76] .
Furthermore, over the last few years, several 3G clients (usually mobile phones) have been equipped with additional functionalities to allow payment. Especially in developing and emerging countries such solutions are very successful, since they bridge the lack of local banking institutions or ATMs. An example of such a solution is the M-PESA system [77] , which has been successfully deployed in Kenya. Funds stored on the customer's mobile phone account may not necessarily be used for just paying the phone bill. As well, the mobile phone account can be used in a similar fashion to a bank account and the stored funds can be easily transferred to another mobile phone account or even reimbursed into money at so-called agents (e.g., gas stations or supermarkets).
B. IP Multimedia Subsystem
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), which was originally designed by 3GPP in 1999, is an architectural framework for delivering IP multimedia services [78] . IMS specifies interactions between different types of networks based on IP to achieve a standardized access to Service Providers [79] . IMS is access-independent as it supports IP to IP sessions over wired IP, 802.11, 802.15, CDMA, packet data along with GSM/EDGE/UMTS and other packet data applications. In IMS, two different charging methods are usually deployed: online and offline charging [80] . If the online charging method is deployed, the Serving Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF) communicates with a Session Charging Function (SCF), which is able to stop the session at the S-CSCF when the user runs out of credits. If the offline charging method is used, all SIP network entities involved in the session send accounting data to a Charging Collector Function (CCF), which collects all the data in order to build a Call Detail Record (CDR). Both online and offline charging solutions rely on a Credit-Control Application [81] to exchange credit control data. Besides these charging mechanisms, IMS does not offer any direct payment solution to its users. Figure 1 shows the IMS elements described. To obtain an overview of all components within such a process, see [82] .
C. Liberty Alliance Payment
Whilst Liberty Alliance has already been described in general in Section III-B, this section discusses only those aspects of the Liberty Alliance specification that are considered for use within payment processes. In contrast to Shibboleth, being the other major SAML-based Identity Federation, Liberty Alliance focuses on commercial usage and, thus, foresees payment. However, Liberty-based interactions with a Payment Service are described in [83] and [84] .
A typical shopping process with payment based on Liberty Alliance is depicted in Figure 2 and may be carried out as follows:
(1) The Customer initiates a purchase of some goods or services at the Merchant's site. Shipping Service to deliver the goods to the Customer. (6) The Shipping Service delivers the goods to the Customer. Although this Liberty Alliance process includes payments, it is obvious that it is more a charging and billing mechanism than a direct payment within the Identity Federation. The Payment Service as well as the Bank provides data about payment to the participating entities in the Federation, but the actual payment has to be carried out without using Federation transactions. Here, the payment may be done by a simple wire transfer in order to transfer the funds between the Customer's Bank and the Merchant's Bank.
D. Diameter Credit Control Application
Diameter [85] , which has been deployed as a successor to the Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) [86] specification, is a protocol for Authentication, Authorization and Accounting. Over the last few years, due to the lack of a reliable implementation, it was only used in research projects such as [3] or [87] . However, it is now being deployed in commercial environments as well. A 3GPP-modified implementation is even used in IMS [78] .
As one of several enhancements to the Diameter base protocol, the Diameter Credit Control Application [81] has been specified. Diameter Credit Control Application utilizes the mechanisms provided by the Diameter base protocol to provide credit control to the service nodes. The use of the application is not restricted to service nodes; it can also be used for access control [88] . Within Diameter Credit Control, usually two kinds of charging methods are used: service charging with credit reservation and direct debiting. Service charging with credit reservation includes the process of requesting, reserving and deducting credit from the subscribers account. The Diameter session-based (start, interim, stop) accounting records are utilized for this functionality. Figure  3 depicts a typical message flow within the service charging with credit reservation process. The direct debiting works as follows: When the user requests a service from the service node, the service node acts as a Diameter Credit Control Client and contacts the Credit Control Server which authorizes the service request, deducts the required monetary amount from the users account and returns to the service node the granted units the service is allowed to consume. If the user runs out of credit, the direct debiting mechanism prevents the user from further consuming the service.
Obviously, the Diameter Credit Control Application provides a strong framework for charging and billing, but it cannot be used for direct payments.
E. Mobile Phone Federation Payment
In 2004, Siemens AG submitted a European patent in which an approach for payment in SSO mobile networks has been depicted [89] . When a third party requires payment, it contacts the user with an authentication request and information about the service cost. The IdP, that hosts the user's account, receives the payment information and reserves the amount, providing the user has (a) enough money on his prepaid account or (b) a post-paid account that can be charged. After that, the IdP (here being seen as the mobile network provider) sends a token containing authentication and authorization information, together with the information about the funds reserved, to the SP. The SP informs the network provider about the user's service access and delivers the service to the consumer. After receiving a confirmation of service delivery, the network provider charges the consumer for the service consumption.
However, this describes only one possibility for exchanging payment information within an SSO federation and establishes no direct payment, since debiting is done after service delivery, when the SP informs the IdP. The submitted token can be seen only as information about a reservation of the user's monetary funds and not as being digital cash. Moreover, that the IdP is aware of the transaction's information (privacy issue) and that the IdP has to host the user's monetary account (no possibility to decouple IdP and paying institution), is also a disadvantage of this patent.
F. Payment using SAML Attribute Assertions
The first step towards the complete integration of payment processes into the Identity Federation infrastructure was done by Jennings [90] by proposing to use SAML Attribute Assertions for payment of SIP sessions. Since SAML is largely used as a federation support language, a SAML based payment approach can lead to a combined solution of payment and federations. Although the proposed solution focuses on SIP sessions, this section discusses only the SAML related parts.
To integrate a payment approach into SAML, Jennings extended the usual federation architecture, consisting of User, Service Provider and Identity Provider. He introduces the Payment Provider (PP), a component that hosts the User's account and that is allowed to send his money to merchants when the user is required to pay within that federation. The process, defined for consuming a resource, has also been extended: After authentication and authorization a payment opportunity is proposed. Assuming that the User wants to consume a service requiring payment, the Service Provider sends a Payment Offer, in which information, such as SP identity, merchant bits, etc. are stated, to the User.
Within such a Payment Offer the SP specifies the details of its offer and combines them with information needed to assign further communication to this offer. Whilst the meaning of the information, such as the cost description (price per unit, currency, namespace, etc.) and the SP data (URL and a merchant identifier for the federation) seems to be obvious, other elements of the Payment Offer have to be specified in more detail. The Expiry Information entry specifies the date when the offer expires and the merchantBits is a string, which provides the transaction participants the opportunity to assign the payment being carried out to an offer, since each offer is done with different corresponding bits. Such a payment offer could look as follows: After receiving this information, the User can decide to accept the offer or to refuse it. In the first case, the User has to contact his PP and request a payment assertion. This can be done within a SAML authentication request, carrying the following information in the extension section: Most of the information listed in this payment request is taken from the standard SAML definition and will not be described here. The information transmitted is needed to generate a Payment Assertion with the correct amount as well as to identify the transaction the assertion belongs to.
The PP initiates the payment process by examining the User's authentication and checks if he is authorized for the payment process. If so, the PP generates a payment receipt and the account of the User is charged, related to the contractual agreement between the User and the PP, either at this point or at a specified time later. Depending on the chosen mode, the receipt is either a SAML Payment Assertion or a SAML URI Reference that acts as a pointer to the assertion stored at the PP. The Payment Receipt is then sent to the user, who presents it to the SP as a proof of payment. If the PP uses the assertion as receipt, the SP can examine the assertion directly; otherwise it has to contact the PP requesting resolution of the URI. However, the core of such a payment assertion is an attribute statement, which can look as follows: The assertion's elements that comprise this attribute statement will not be explained in detail in this section, since most of it is part of the standard SAML assertion definition [91] . All payment related information is in the attribute statement block of the assertion conveyed within the <saml:AttributeStatement>. While many attribute elements are taken from the payment request carried out by the User, which, in turn, has taken information from the Payment Offer sent by the Service Provider, the PP inserts two new elements: The pspBits are, similar to the merchantBits for SP and User, a way for the PP to assign the assertion to the accordant transaction. The serviceUrl specifies the URL of the PP's payment service.
This payment protocol ( Figure 4 describes the message flow for a scenario using a SAML URI Reference as receipt) should be recognized as one of the first solutions to combine both worlds, the Identity Federations with an ePayment approach. Since the SAML language is used to transfer the receipts, this approach can be easily integrated into the current federation infrastructure. The establishment of a Payment Provider in a similar way as an Identity Provider and the transfer of payment from the application layer into the federation architecture is a major advantage for this solution.
Therefore, this approach is a major step towards IdentityFederation based payments. Actually, it guarantees a basic payment, but there are also some disadvantages that should not be dismissed. The assertion does not require a signature of the PP or any other information, which can prove that the assertion was issued by the PP. Although the SP can rely on the certificate that the PP provides when transmitting the assertion, the SP has no proof of that transmission, when it requests the monetary reimbursement. Thus, the assertion can only be seen as a receipt for payment, already done, and not as a real payment. The amount in the assertion should be the exact amount desired by the SP. Therefore, if the consumer pays too much, the SP has to use the same mechanism (contacting its PP, payment request, SAML URI, etc.) to partially or fully refund the money. However, there is also a privacy issue, which may lead to much concern in using this approach. The PP needs knowledge about the consumer's identity (for charging him), about the SP (for sending the assertion) and about the merchant bits. This means that the consumer's PP knows which consumer bought what goods, services, etc., at which SP. In the following subsection, an approach is presented that requires less consumer related data to carry out the payment process.
G. SAML Payment Assertions
The concept of SAML Payment Assertions, which was developed within the SWIFT project [2] , allows the combination of SAML-based Identity Federation with payment processes [17] . In contrast to the Attribute Assertion-based payment, the SAML-based payment solution specifies a new type of assertion: the SAML Payment Assertion [92] . Since this concept is very new, it is now described in detail.
Today, a typical identity federation contains the following three participating entities: (1) the Service Provider, who offers services but often requires the user's authorization based upon attributes, (2) the Identity Provider, who controls the user's account and issues authentication and authorization data, and, finally, (3) the User or Consumer, who wishes to gain access to an online resource offered by a Service Provider. This architecture has been modified and enhanced to support payment at the Identity Federation layer by using SAML Payment Assertions. By integrating the payments into the federation architecture and its protocols, the SAML-based payment solution can be deployed whenever a SAML-based Identity Federation is being used [93] .
Whilst the Identity Provider does not need to be changed to enable payments, some modifications at the Service Provider and the Consumer have to be made to support payment within the federation: A payment-enabled Service Provider requires some payment related access policies and the possibility to store received payment data. The Consumer must also change: firstly, he needs another provider other than the Identity Provider (i.e., the Payment Provider), where he needs to have an account. Secondly, a small payment application may be required in addition to the service access application. However, both of these applications could be combined into just one application, e.g., a Web browser. Apart from these components, the payment enabled federation needs a new component to be developed that provides payment within the federation in the same way as the Identity Provider does for the Consumer's identity. The proposed Payment Provider handles authentication and authorization in the same way as Service Providers, but is enhanced to support payment.
The completely new element of the Payment Provider to be designed is thus associated with payment-related tasks. Here, three processes are identified, which the Payment Provider is required to participate in. The first generates payment datathe Payment Provider generates the data that the Consumer requires later for paying the Service Provider. The second process covers the validation of payment data -whenever payment data is transmitted, the receiver should have the opportunity to be assured about its correctness. The third process defines the reimbursement of the payment data into real money -money circulating inside the federation should be reimbursed into real money as soon as the owner wishes to do so. Therefore, the Payment Provider has to cover all three tasks in order to provide a reliable payment solution within the federation.
The concept, as designed, has been separated into hardwarebased and software-based security solutions to avoid insecurity [94] . The hardware-based security solution relies on tamperproof hardware to protect the payment data [95] , whilst the software-based security solution uses a validity-request at the issuing payment provider to detect misbehaviour [96] .
1) Payment Data Generation:
The first of the three processes related to federation payment is the generation and issuing of payment data by the Consumer's Payment Provider. The Consumer sends a request for payment data to his Payment Provider, where the transmitted data (e.g., authentication data and attributes) are evaluated and the Consumer's account is checked. If all security checks are passed successfully, the Payment Provider generates the data, stores locally some information about its creation and sends the signed payment data to the Consumer. The issuing/generation process is depicted in Figure 5 .
During the Payment Statement Request, a SAML Payment Request is sent from the Consumer to his Payment Provider. This request uses the extensions definition of the existing SAML Request [97] and may look as follows: 
2) Payment:
The main process is the actual payment, usually between a Consumer as payer and a Service Provider as payee. The Consumer signs, after he has been informed about the required payment, the already issued payment data and sends it to the Service Provider. The provider initially checks the security data such as digital signatures as well as the amount and its currency as supplied within the data. For further validation, the provider could also contact the issuing Payment Provider who may inform the Service Provider about tampering or overspending with respect to the payment data. If all validations are passed successfully, the Service Provider allows the Consumer to consume the service. The payment process is depicted in Figure 6 (the marked rectangle is used only in one of several security solutions).
The major SAML element used during the SAML-based payment is the newly designed SAML Payment Assertion, which has been specified based on the already defined SAML Assertions [97] . A SAML Response containing such a SAML Payment Assertion may look as follows: 
3) Reimbursement:
The third and last process in the chain of payment related processes is the reimbursement of the payment data into real money, usually requested by the SP at the issuing Payment Provider. The PP validates all the pieces of data (digital signatures, amount and currency, checks for overspending and tampering, optional SP authentication) and if the validation passes successfully, it credits the required amount to the SP's account. The reimbursement process is depicted in Figure 7 (the marked rectangle may not always be used).
H. Comparison
As described above, the charging, billing and payment specifications as well as the use cases for Identity Federations have shown a large spectrum of mechanisms that allow monetary transfers within Federations to be carried out. However, some of them must not be seen as Identity Federations, some of them support only charging and only a few even offer payment support. Table V provides a brief summary of the approaches discussed and indicates whether the mechanism is deployed within an Identity Federation context and if it only offers charging mechanisms or payment solutions as well.
After this general comparison, the approaches have been analyzed in relation to the requirements for electronic payments, as specified in Section II-D. Table IV details the results of this evaluation. Note that not all approaches offer payment solutions and, therefore, not all have to be evaluated in regard to all the requirements. For example, an approach that does not provide a payment solution does not need evaluating in regard to the unforgeability of digital money. Furthermore, besides clear yes/no decisions, in some approaches several aspects may be deployed, but not for each specification, should more than one exist. In such cases, the requirement has been entered as 'possible'. Finally, some aspects have no clear outcome and therefore the entry 'maybe' will also be found in the table.
However, when considering Table V , only two approaches can be found that provide support for all three aspectsIdentity Federation, charging and payment -namely Attribute Assertion Payment and Payment Assertion Payment. Table IV provides more information about the strength of both approaches and clearly identifies the Payment Assertion solution as being the most powerful 10 . Although having the same 9 The results regarding acceptability of the payment approaches have been evaluated by discussion with members of redIRIS [7] , DFN [98] , and eduGAIN [99] . 10 See Section II-D for a description of the requirements used in this comparison technical demands as the Attribute Assertion Payment, the Payment Assertion approach is the only approach to fulfil all requirements except that of anonymity, which is, contrary to pseudonymity, not wanted here, based on the nature of Identity Federations. Note, that some requirements are marked as possible, which means that the proposed architecture is able to fulfil the accordant requirement by small changes. However, only the Payment Assertion approach offers support for Identity Federations, charging and payment combined with high acceptability and the required level of security and usability. In addition, the Payment Assertion approach can easily be linked to other Identity Federation payment solutions [100] .
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, NEXT STEPS, AND LESSONS LEARNED
Due to the ever growing importance of Identity Federations and also the need for most Service Providers to offer paid services, it is only a question of time when Federation-based payment will be deployed. Thus, this survey has investigated the approaches, currently designed, for such payment solutions and offers a valuable overview of the basics, the requirements and the solutions for Identity Federation payment. To reach this concluding overview, initially the important Identity Federation schemes have been analysed, followed by a detailed view on solutions for electronic payment. Finally, the combination of both areas, i.e., those approaches related to Identity Federation based payments has been investigated and in conclusion, the SAML-based Payment solution has been identified as being the most powerful: offering support for Identity Federation, charging and payment combined with a high acceptability as well as the required level of security and usability.
Obviously, although many approaches for electronic payment exist, ranging from simple submission of account information up to the transmission of digital cash, none of the traditional methods is able to serve Identity Federations. From the several mechanisms used to establish an Identity Federation, the SAML-based solutions are the most successful. Therefore, a combination of electronic payment within SAMLbased federations is considered useful and desirable. However, from all of the identity-based payment approaches discussed in this paper, only two were SAML-based. Both, payment using Attribute Assertions and the integrated Payment Assertionbased payment methods provide enough capabilities 11 to fulfil all the needs identified by the two scenarios described at the beginning of this paper.
However, out of those two approaches, the Payment Assertion solution provides significantly more benefits. In addition to those mentioned in Section IV-H, this approach has been analysed based on a detailed architectural evaluation and a security analysis in [17] . Besides these two analyses being carried out, a prototypical implementation [17] has proven that the SAML-based payment approach can be successfully deployed.
Although this survey has clearly marked the two solutions as providing most benefits, future research still remains to be carried out. Since they are not widely deployed, reasons have to be found why this is the case and what countermeasures could be carried out. Usability and Security may be taken into more consideration as they have been so far. Only by following the current approaches and by building up a reliable payment solution for Identity Federations, could the drawbacks for commercial Service Provides be avoided and broad Identity Federations could be established.
The use of payments within federations in an integrated manner, especially by utilizing the SAML technology, has been surveyed within this paper. Additionally, a concrete solution for payments in identity federations has been designed, which settles a number of problems known for SAMLbased approaches as outlined above. As such, the benefits determined (customer convenience, service provider flexibility, and operator involvement) have been achieved. Therefore, the application of SAML in identity federations, extended with relevant payment functionality, designs a practical and applicable solution, which determines the key lesson learned within this paper: The successful SAML technology is capable to accommodate those extensions defined and achieves the highest level of benefits for federation-based set-up, which address all stakeholders as named just above.
